Conference Agenda

This paper addresses the widely accepted assumption that neighbouring birth cohorts in Western societies share characteristic values, attitudes and behaviours which at the same time set them apart from historically more distinct cohorts (Howe 2023; Howe and Strauss 1991, 2000; Mannheim 1928). In recent years, 'Generation Y' has received considerable attention in public discourse. The unique circumstances of coming of age at the turn of the century are supposed to have shaped their attitudes and behaviour in a generation-specific manner, distinguishing them from the preceding and succeeding cohorts commonly referred to as Generations X and Z (Coupland 1991; Kupperschmitt 1998; Shapiro 2018).

Both Generation X and Generation Y in Europe have grown up in the era of overcoming the East-West divide, in a neo-liberal economic environment, and increased insecurity in youth labour markets. Likewise, both generations share experiences of advanced demographic changes, cultural liberalisation, and delayed transitions into adulthood. Although the formation phase of both generations took place in times of increased labour market insecurity, it can be assumed that the working sphere of Generation Y was shaped even more by global contexts and insecure working conditions. In particular, the financial market crisis and the sovereign debt crisis caused upheavals in the lives of young adults in parts of Europe in the 2010s (Kiss 2022).

Based on survey rounds 3 and 9 of the ESS, we take up this debate by investigating the members of the 1966 to 1980 (Generation X) and 1981 to 1995 (Generation Y) cohorts in 16 European countries (grouped into six country clusters). We compare their occupational and family status of both Generations in young adulthood (mid-twenties to late thirties), taking advantage of the ‘Timing of life’ modules implemented in the 2006 and 2018 surveys. Our analyses specifically address the question of whether there are characteristic differences in the life course of these cohorts that could qualify them as distinct generations. We use key life course criteria such as leaving parental home and family formation, cohabitation and marriage, as well as labour market experiences such as temporary employment, unemployment, quality of work, and work autonomy.

Preliminary results indicate that the assumption of homogeneous life course experiences among neighbouring birth cohorts cannot be confirmed. While there is a cross-national trend of postponing family life experiences and a better subjective evaluation of labour market experiences, we do not find straightforward evidence that Generation Y, across Europe, has faced more insecure labour market conditions compared to Generation X.

Due to rising educational attainment and an increased participation in the labour market, balancing family and professional responsibilities has become a persistent challenge for many European women. This is often perceived as one of the main reasons why these women have been delaying significant life events such as childbirth in the past decades. We investigate the impact of early motherhood on labour market outcomes across various European contexts, where countries differ in cultural age norms as well as family and labour market policies. In general, motherhood coming earlier than cultural norms prescribe, is expected to be associated with less favourable labour market outcomes. In countries with an extensive social safety net and higher levels of gender equality, this negative impact of early motherhood may be attenuated. We investigate these issues using the Timing of Life Module from the European Social Survey data from 2018, covering 29 countries. Preliminary results show that there is an association between early motherhood and unemployment in Europe. In Mediterranean countries early motherhood can be linked to more part time labour and in liberal welfare states with unemployment. Against expectations, early motherhood in social-democratic countries is associated with both more unemployment and part time labour. Since we find that the welfare state typology used so far does not work well to make sense of diversity across Europe, we will next move away from this clustering and employ multilevel modeling and fixed effects models to address cultural and institutional differences.

Until recently, highly educated women have been more likely to remain childless than women with lower educational attainment but there are signs that this has been changing in a number of European countries. One reason is that it has become increasingly difficult for women with low education to secure a stable partnership. This may be related to the rise of the dual-earner family model, where women’s labour market earnings have become increasingly important for the family’s economic well-being, as a result changing men’s preferences for a higher educated partner. Results from single-country studies have shown increasing childlessness and postponement of births among the lower educated indeed, especially in the Nordic countries. Nevertheless, general trends across regions in Europe remain unclear and the focus lies on descriptive results rather than testing causality.

The aim of this article, therefore, is to analyse how women’s likelihood of having a first child is influenced by their educational level and to what extent this relationship can be explained by changing selection into partnerships. We explore these relations using European Social Survey data from 2006 and 2018 from 27 countries. Specifically, we make use of the Timing of Life module from Round 3 and 9 of the ESS which asks respondents about the timing of events such as first union formation and age at first birth. This retrospective information allows for event history analysis taking the chronology into account. We select women and men born in cohorts from 1960 to 2004 to ensure they are at least 15 years old at the time of interview. We jointly model union formation and entry into parenthood and their interrelationships using structural equation modelling. Given that we are dealing with non-repeatable events, i.e., first birth and first co-residential union, to identify the model, we apply exclusion restriction criteria, benefiting from ESS richness. In the model of union formation, we plan to include information about the ideal time of first living with a partner not married to, which is directly linked to the transition to first union, while not necessarily to the transition to parenthood.

In Europe, union formation has been steadily postponed and has become more de-standardized across birth cohorts. In addition, studies have shown that a higher socioeconomic status is associated with delays in family formation and with diverse life course trajectories. What remains unknown are the consequences that these trends produce for individuals: in other words, whether postponing crucial life transitions or, in general, experiencing them at non-normative ages is good or bad for individual wellbeing. The link between family trajectories and wellbeing outcomes in mid- and late-life such as health, wealth, or loneliness has been examined by a number of studies, reporting mixed evidence on the consequences of non-normative transitions and underlining the relevance of the country context and of gender. Crucially, the existing literature has not focused on the timing of events, and little is known about younger cohorts, among whom postponement has become particularly remarkable.

This study addresses the repercussions on subjective wellbeing of entering the first union comparatively “early” or comparatively “late”, using data from the timing of life module contained in Round 3 (2006) and Round 9 (2018) of the European Social Survey. Specifically, two measures of age at event are computed on the first coresidential union as well as on the first marriage. First, I capture whether individuals have experienced the event by age 30 or not (i.e., are aged 30 + and have not yet experienced the event, or have experienced the event at age 30+); second, on a subsample of individuals having experienced the event, I measure the difference between their age at event and the average age at the country level. I study the association with subjective wellbeing, measured using indicators of happiness and life satisfaction, at age 31-65 on the first sample, and at age 45-65 on the second sample, using linear regression models.

Preliminary results show that not having experienced the first union or first marriage by age 30 is associated with a drop in all indicators of subjective wellbeing; this drop is remarkable among the younger cohorts. I also consider whether the wellbeing of these two groups differs at various ages. When considering the first coresidential union, differences are negligible and reduce with age, whereas differences are sizeable and persistent when considering the first marriage. The analysis on individuals aged 45-65 shows a drop in wellbeing among individuals who experienced the first union too early or too late compared to the country average, whereas deviations from the average age at marriage are less consequential for wellbeing. In the next steps, I plan to explore geographical variation as well as gender differences.

These findings call for further attention on the nexus between the timing of events and subjective wellbeing, and, also, on the distinguished meanings of marriage and cohabitation in European societies. The changes that we are currently observing in the transition to adulthood have long-lasting implications for individuals’ wellbeing, and may potentially have repercussions for later-life outcomes.