| Session | ||
The causes and consequences of political polarization II
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| Session Abstract | ||
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Increasing political polarization is often seen as one of the contemporary challenges to liberal democracy, and there is an ongoing debate about polarization’s causes and consequences. High levels of polarization are thought to, among other things, reduce social cohesion by increasing the distance - whether ideological or emotional - between groups based on partisan affinities, thereby increasing the cost of inter-group cooperation, finding common ground, and working toward shared goals. Moreover, high polarization increases support for illiberal parties and the readiness to favor partisan goals at the cost of democratic principles, which pose a direct threat to contemporary democracy. Increases in polarization have also been linked to the rise of populist parties and to anti-populist mobilization, which further increase polarization. While research on polarization is extensive, it continues to be dominated by studies of the United States, and is fragmented due to the variety of conceptualizations and operationalizations of polarization. Thus, the aim of this session is thus to examine the causes and consequences of political polarization in Europe with an eye on reconciling different analytical approaches. | ||
| Presentations | ||
Robots Replacing Trade Unions: Novel Data and Evidence from Western Europe 1Bocconi University, Italy; 2Duke University, USA; 3Yale-NUS, Singapore Economic distress and individual exposure to automation have emerged as significant determinants of the increasing success of populist and radical-right parties and candidates in advanced democracies. However, the debate on why such technologically-driven economic grievances have expressed a decidedly right-wing character and not favored pro-redistribution, and traditional left-wing, parties is still unsettled. Historically, labor unions have played a crucial role in liberal democracies by hindering the increasing wage inequality, by channeling political demands and discontent into an organized voice, and by linking blue-collar constituencies to mainstream left parties. However, the importance and effectiveness of unions in the democratic process have progressively diminished in the last decades, combined with an atomization of political demands. We suggest that technological change, and robotization in particular, have directly contributed to weakening the role of unions. We employ novel granular data, at the subnational and sector level, on union density in Western Europe over two decades, to estimate the impact of industrial robot adoption on unionization rates. Our novel data on subnational union density are constructed by using a multi-level regression with post-stratification approach that relies on statistically representative surveys from the European Social Survey and census or labor force data from 15 Western European countries. Furthermore, we find evidence that de-unionization leads to political polarization. Our findings contribute to shed new light on the mechanism by which regions and individuals more exposed to automation tilt towards nationalist, isolationist, and radical right parties. Social Media and the Gender Ideology Divide 1Catolica Lisbon School of Business and Economics, Portugal; 2Universität Bielefeld Recent evidence across several countries shows that the gender ideology divide among the youngest is widening: young women tend to be more liberal than conservative, compared with young men. In this paper, we first confirm this tendency from the European Social Survey data: Young females increasingly identify with the left side of the political spectrum, while males are more and more inclined towards the right. Our estimates show that, in Europe, women aged 18 to 30 are now 20 percentage points more left-wing than their male counterparts. Leveraging spatial data on 3G and 4G coverage expansion since 2010, we show that in regions with highly developed network coverage, this ideological divide is more pronounced and emerged earlier. Our results suggest a significant influence of social media use in exacerbating the ideological gap, likely because young men and women differ in their usage. The Emergence of Radical Right Parties in Europe: The Influence of Female Breadwinners, Household Financial Tensions, and Sexism. Carlos III University, Spain Regarding the enduring rise in the influence of populist radical right parties (RRP) throughout Europe, this study examines the connection between sympathy for these political options, the sexist backlash reaction (Anduiza and Rico 2021), and political preference formation within households (Abou-Chadi and Kurer 2021). To what extent are masculinities triggered by breaking the male-breadwinner rule within households trumping sympathy for RRP? The financial stress mechanism is at the crux of the literature delving into household dynamics to explain the rise of RRP. The unrest generated by economic insecurity is one of the main sources of political preference change concretely fostering support for RRP (Rodrik 2018). Empirical results support this idea, but the intensity and directionality of the effect depend on the gender of the members (Abou-Chadi and Kurer 2021). Hegemonic gender culture conceives men as family providers while women are the caregivers. Men might perceive the contrary as a challenge to their sense of masculinity (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). Men’s unrest emerges from the intricate connection between employment and the construction of masculine identity in opposition to femininity (Connell 2010; Maynard 1999), leading to political attitudes changes among men (Rao 2021). Being outearned by their female partners is expected to trigger modern sexist attitudes, which literature solidly relates to support for populist radical right-wing parties (Anduiza and Rico 2022). Hypotheses are built on the premise that traditional masculine identities feel threatened in households where women are providers, leading to an increase in sexist attitudes and support for RRPs. Rounds 7 to 10 of the European Social Survey (ESS) cover 18 European countries from 2014 to 2020 whose RRP were relevant enough to be reported by respondents. Logistic regression analyses suggest that the financial stress hypothesis cannot stand alone. Men outearned by their partners are more likely to feel sympathy for RRP, which does not replicate among women. Thus, the gender stress mechanism within households deserves further exploration. I endeavor to contribute to the discussion of household settings to form political preferences alongside the literature associating sexism and populist attitudes. References: [1] Abou-Chadi, Tarik, and Thomas Kurer. 2021. “Economic risk within the household and voting for the radical right” World Politics 73(3): 482-511 [2] Anduiza, Eva, and Guillem Rico. 2022. “Sexism and the Far-Right Vote: The Individual Dynamics of Gender Backlash.” American Journal of Political Science 0(0): 1-16. [3] Connell, Raewyn W. 2010. Gender. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. [4] Margalit, Yotam. 2019. “Economic Insecurity and the Causes of Populism, Reconsidered.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 33(4): 152–70. (https://doi .org/10.1257/jep.33.4.152.) [5] Rao, Aliya Hamid. 2021. “Gendered interpretations of job loss and subsequent professional pathways” Gender & Society 35(6): 884-909. [6] Rodrik, Dani. 2018. “Populism and the Economics of Globalization.” Journal of International Business Policy 1(1–2): 12–33. (https://doi.org/10.1057/s4 2214-018-0001-4). | ||