Regarding the enduring rise in the influence of populist radical right parties (RRP) throughout Europe, this study examines the connection between sympathy for these political options, the sexist backlash reaction (Anduiza and Rico 2021), and political preference formation within households (Abou-Chadi and Kurer 2021). To what extent are masculinities triggered by breaking the male-breadwinner rule within households trumping sympathy for RRP?
The financial stress mechanism is at the crux of the literature delving into household dynamics to explain the rise of RRP. The unrest generated by economic insecurity is one of the main sources of political preference change concretely fostering support for RRP (Rodrik 2018). Empirical results support this idea, but the intensity and directionality of the effect depend on the gender of the members (Abou-Chadi and Kurer 2021).
Hegemonic gender culture conceives men as family providers while women are the caregivers. Men might perceive the contrary as a challenge to their sense of masculinity (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). Men’s unrest emerges from the intricate connection between employment and the construction of masculine identity in opposition to femininity (Connell 2010; Maynard 1999), leading to political attitudes changes among men (Rao 2021). Being outearned by their female partners is expected to trigger modern sexist attitudes, which literature solidly relates to support for populist radical right-wing parties (Anduiza and Rico 2022).
Hypotheses are built on the premise that traditional masculine identities feel threatened in households where women are providers, leading to an increase in sexist attitudes and support for RRPs. Rounds 7 to 10 of the European Social Survey (ESS) cover 18 European countries from 2014 to 2020 whose RRP were relevant enough to be reported by respondents. Logistic regression analyses suggest that the financial stress hypothesis cannot stand alone. Men outearned by their partners are more likely to feel sympathy for RRP, which does not replicate among women. Thus, the gender stress mechanism within households deserves further exploration. I endeavor to contribute to the discussion of household settings to form political preferences alongside the literature associating sexism and populist attitudes.
References:
[1] Abou-Chadi, Tarik, and Thomas Kurer. 2021. “Economic risk within the household and voting for the radical right” World Politics 73(3): 482-511
[2] Anduiza, Eva, and Guillem Rico. 2022. “Sexism and the Far-Right Vote: The Individual Dynamics of Gender Backlash.” American Journal of Political Science 0(0): 1-16.
[3] Connell, Raewyn W. 2010. Gender. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
[4] Margalit, Yotam. 2019. “Economic Insecurity and the Causes of Populism, Reconsidered.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 33(4): 152–70. (https://doi .org/10.1257/jep.33.4.152.)
[5] Rao, Aliya Hamid. 2021. “Gendered interpretations of job loss and subsequent professional pathways” Gender & Society 35(6): 884-909.
[6] Rodrik, Dani. 2018. “Populism and the Economics of Globalization.” Journal of International Business Policy 1(1–2): 12–33. (https://doi.org/10.1057/s4 2214-018-0001-4).