Conference Agenda

Since the outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020, numerous scientific studies and policy reports have been analyzed the consequences of the pandemic. While much emphasis is often (rightly) placed on the health and economic implications of the pandemic, the social effects tend to be largely neglected. An important aspect of these social consequences relates to public opinion regarding the government's handling of the pandemic. An important lesson in this regard is that the effectiveness of many government interventions largely depends on the extent to which these measures are supported by the population. Measures without public legitimacy risk polarizing the population and eroding trust in political institutions and democracy in general.

In this analysis we will explore to what extent the citizens of different European countries are (dis)satisfied with the way their governments have handled the pandemic. To explain the variation in (dis)satisfaction, we will take a closer look at four factors that are likely to have an influence. First, we will investigate to what extent (dis)satisfaction is related to the exposure to COVID-19 risks. Are respondents who were directly affected by the pandemic – because they were infected or suffered adverse economic consequences – more dissatisfied than others? We also examine whether socio-economic background characteristics play a role. Are there differences in terms of (dis)satisfaction between people living in different types of residences, various employment status and families with and without children? We will then investigate the role of ideational factors. Do factors such as political orientation, institutional trust and conspiracy thinking play a role in explaining (dis)satisfaction? Finally, we will examine the effects of contextual factors. What is the influence of the stringency of the restrictive measures, the extent of economic recession and the mortality rate on the (dis)satisfaction of the population?

In the analysis we will use data from the 10th round of the European Social Survey (ESS). This round includes a module designed specifically to tap into people’s experiences and views on the COVID-19 pandemic, making it a uniquely valuable source for studying (dis)satisfaction with COVID-19 policies in a cross-national perspective. In the analysis we will employ multilevel regression models which will allow us to simultaneously model the individual and contextual determinants of (dis)satisfaction with the COVID-19 measures.

Vaccine hesitancy has been on the rise worldwide for a long time, and it has been particularly amplified during the COVID-19 pandemic. In numerous countries, vaccine hesitancy has taken on a political dimension, and various studies have found that political ideology is a significant predictor of this phenomenon (e.g. Pavić et al., 2023; Pavlović et al., 2021). According to many studies, individuals who lean toward the right are more likely to be vaccine-hesitant (e.g. Conway et al., 2021, Baumgaertner et al., 2018; Rabinowitz et al., 2016 ). The politicization of COVID-19 pandemic management strategies has further strengthened the link between political attitudes and vaccine hesitancy.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, people's attitudes towards vaccines were influenced by their overall stance towards protective measures implemented by governments. Many studies across the world have shown that vaccine hesitancy during this period was linked to (dis)trust in the government and other entities managing the pandemic crisis (Jennings et al.,2023, Bagić et al., 2022). However, there is a lack of research exploring the relationship between loyalty to the governing party(s) and acceptance of protective measures, including vaccination. Following government recommendations or measures may mean supporting political actors that one either approves or disapproves of, which can influence their response to it. An individual's relation to ruling actors can moderate the relationship between their political ideology and attitude towards COVID-19 vaccination.

In this paper, we will analyze how loyalty to the ruling party affects the relationship between political ideology and COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy. Our study will use data from the COVID-19 model and standard modules from ESS round 10 to test the hypothesis that loyalty to a country's governing party(s) moderates the relationship between political ideology (measured by left-right self-positioning) and COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy. Furthermore, we will explore whether this relationship is context-specific or universal, based on the political system's structure and the profile of the ruling party(s). Our analysis will include data from nine countries (out of 20) that implemented the COVID-19 module in a face-to-face mode. To ensure diversity, three countries will be selected from each of the three European subregions with distinct political cultures: South Europe, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe. The chosen countries within each subregion will represent different party systems and governing party(s) profiles during the COVID-19 pandemic. We will employ multilevel logistic regression analysis as an analytical approach.

The COVID-19 pandemic made visible to the global public - as never before - “science in action", in its development process, highlighting aspects supposed to induce dismay in civil society: uncertainty, contradictions, second thoughts. Never before was science so central in public debate and exposed in the media.

Based on international survey data - Round 10 of the ESS, Eurobarometers on Science and Technology, Wellcome Global Monitor -, we explore the issue of trust in science and conspiracy beliefs of the five largest European Union countries by population: Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Poland, in addition to Finland, a Northern European country, particularly interesting due to its scientific knowledge performances.

Moving from some studies that found a positive impact of the pandemic on trust in science, our analysis shows the increase in trust as part of a trend that was already ongoing, differently from the case of trust in governments, which profited from the “rally around the flag” effect.

While investigating trust in science, moving from Eurobarometers on Science and Technology, we highlight the emergence of two different visions: a "salvific" science, capable of making the earth's resources inexhaustible and sorting out any problem; and a “tangible”, secular science, which makes our lives easier, more comfortable and healthier and that overall has a beneficial influence on society. Note that scientific knowledge levels positively impact only tangible science. If tangible science shows high levels of trust in all the countries considered, Italy, Spain and Poland present significant percentages in favor of salvific science.

At the same time, analyzing the Round 10 of the ESS data, we can observe in the latter countries a stronger attitude to conspiracy beliefs. Indeed, Italy, Spain and Poland populations present higher percentages of agreement with the beliefs that COVID-19 is result of deliberate and concealed efforts of some government or organization, that small secret group of people are responsible for making all major decisions in world politics, and that groups of scientists manipulate, fabricate, or suppress evidence in order to deceive the public. The analysis of ESS data also shows that educational levels basically impact on these beliefs, although with some fluctuations, especially at the lowest educational levels.

Our study shows that what is urgent to detect is not only the level of trust in science per se, but the “quality” of this trust; indeed, the countries where the agreement with a vision of “salvific” science is higher present a stronger tendency to conspiracy beliefs. What emerges is the need to act at two levels: strengthening education and scientific knowledge; fostering a “tangible” vision of science, that allows a mature relationship between science and society, aligned with the concept of scientific citizenship. To this aim, it would also be appropriate to promote non-sensationalistic narratives of science, giving space to the methods, concepts of ongoing progress, uncertainty and self-correction that are inherent in the processes of building scientific knowledge.

People may turn to religion to cope with difficulties and uncertainty (Bentzen, 2020; Norris et al., 2011). This also appears to have happened during the recent pandemic, when those most severely affected by the crisis reported an increase in religious engagement during the pandemic (Molteni et al., 2021). In addition, Bentzen (2020) indicates an increased interest in online prayer mainly triggered by the WHO's announcement declaring COVID-19 a pandemic, independently of the actual occurrence of the disease in the country.

The opposite effect, i.e. whether religiosity can increase with COVID-19, it also plausible. It has been found that in countries with higher levels of religiosity there is a higher number of cases of COVID-19 and deaths per million inhabitants and a worsening of this situation over time (Linke et al., 2022). In addition, there was a reduction in the mortality rate in US counties that have banned religious gatherings compared with those that have not (Millar et al., 2021). Moreover, there is a strong correlation between nominal church membership, and to a lesser extent church attendance, and the proportion of patients hospitalised with COVID-19 (Vermeer et al., 2020). These studies have mainly focused on macro analyses, which limits the scope of the conclusions that can be drawn regarding the relationship between religiosity and contagion. Firstly, it is important to stress that the most religious countries are often also the most economically disadvantaged, which could introduce a bias into the results. Furthermore, the macro approach adopted in these studies limits our ability to understand the individual mechanisms that might explain why religious people appear to be more likely to be infected with COVID-19.

Using data of Round 10 of European Social Survey, in our study we attempt to clarify at the individual level the relationship between religiosity and COVID-19 contagion. Considering of results from previous studies, we assume that religiosity increases the risk of contracting COVID-19. Although, reversal causation cannot not be excluded, the choice of the indicator of religiosity and appropriate methodology could limit this risk. Preliminary results of multivariate linear probability models show that religiosity affected contagion in Europe. Moreover, gender and the country of residence appear to be moderators of the association. This study could help us to understand the mechanisms behind the contagion during the recent pandemic and contribute to the development of better policies in future crises.

Many studies find a relationship between social media consumption and beliefs in conspiracy theories. Those findings are often presented as evidence that social media causally endorse beliefs in conspiracy theories. We argue that the association between social media and beliefs in conspiracy theories is conditional on other individual-level and country – level factors as well.

Based on European Social Survey (2020) data from Lithuania and Finland, the paper examines the indicators that have an impact on beliefs in conspiracy theories and considers possible solutions to mitigate conspiratorial beliefs in the context of Lithuania and Finland.

The paper draws conclusions that three groups of citizens (believers, undecided, non-believers) may be identified according to their levels of beliefs in conspiracy theories and they significantly differ by socioeconomic status, social media consumption, individual values, interpersonal trust and attitudes to media freedom and inequality within a country. We also find that these relationships are conditional on evaluations of media freedom –– social media consumption becomes more strongly associated with conspiracy beliefs the more negative evaluations of media freedom intensifies. The findings also demonstrate that inferences about the correlates of conspiracy beliefs are highly contingent on the specific conspiracy theories employed by researchers. We argue that improved media literacy may be a part of a strategy to mitigate conspiracy beliefs, but different approaches are necessary to deal with the three identified groups.